Iran's nuclear weapon option emerges from the shadows during the April crisis
The nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran today is more advanced than at any other point in its history. And, especially since April 2024, an ever increasing number of its senior officials and public figures have discussed Iran’s capacity to build nuclear weapons or the possibility that it will do so. Is Tehran close to a decision to build the bomb?
Iran’s nuclear weapon option emerges from the shadows
Rafael Grossi, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said in a Deutsche Welle interview on 23 April 2024 that Iran is "weeks rather than months" away from having a sufficient quantity of enriched uranium to build an atomic bomb, adding "But that does not mean that Iran has or would have a nuclear weapon in that space of time.” He made it clear that while he views the possession of near weapons-grade nuclear material by Tehran as a cause for concern, one could not directly conclude that the country possesses a nuclear weapon and that its true goals were “a matter of speculation," further explaining that "A functional nuclear warhead requires many other things independently from the production of the fissile material."
Grossi’s comments came during a month in which an increasing number Iranian senior officials and public figures made remarks on Iran’s capacity to build nuclear weapons or the possibility that it would change its current policy in order to do so.
Such comments are by no means unprecedented, going back decades, and often coming from close to the highest echelons of power. In 2022, for example, Kamal Kharrazi, a former foreign minister and an advisor to the Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, commented in July and December on the technical ability of Iran to build an atomic bomb, but denied it had made the decision or had the intention to do so.
This year, Ali Akbar Salehi, a former foreign minister and a former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), when asked on state television on 12 February if Iran could build an atomic bomb, indirectly replied:
"We have [crossed] all the thresholds of nuclear science and technology. I will give an example: What does a car require? It needs a chassis, an engine, a steering wheel, a gearbox. You're asking if we have made the gearbox, I say yes. Have we made the engine? Yes, but each one serves its own purpose."
What was previously a pattern of firm denials by Iranian senior figures and official spokespeople regarding any intention or desire on the part of their government to build nuclear weapons, punctuated by intermittent musings about Iran’s ability to do so by former officials and public figures like Kharrazi and Salehi, noticeably shifted in April 2024. Tehran’s signals highlighting the option to build a nuclear weapon during this period conspicuously came from outside of its official nuclear program, and in the context of Israel’s strike on an Iranian consular building in Damascus, Syria, and the subsequent tit-for-tat counterattacks between the two regional adversaries.
The alterable character of the Iranian leader’s “nuclear fatwa”
Mahmoud Reza Aghamiri, the president of Shahid Beheshti University and a nuclear scientist, when questioned on this topic in a TV interview posted on 08 April reiterated Iran’s high level of nuclear capability and argued that “It is not about building the atomic bomb, when your capability is high, this itself means power,” later noting that this ability creates “deterrence” without the need to build the bomb.
He went on to claim that Iran is in a unique place in terms of nuclear technology because it is “…not in the top 10 countries, but in the top 5, because even for France its [nuclear] fuel cycle is not complete…we are a country with a complete fuel cycle.”
What was perhaps most interesting about this interview was the discussion between Aghamiri and the TV interviewer on the so-called “nuclear fatwa” (or religious decree) issued by Iranian Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which is said to forbid on religious grounds the development, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons by Iran.
The interviewer actually begins the clip by referencing the nuclear fatwa, but then notes that “..some have said that [nuclear weapons] can have deterrent and defensive properties.” Aghamiri acknowledges the fatwa, saying that “Today, [the Iranian leader’s] decree is that this should not happen,” with the caveat that this was the case “for now,” and that as a “mujtahed” [Islamic jurist] Ayatollah Khamenei could “change it tomorrow,” a characterization with which the TV interviewer agrees.
The possibility of Iranian nuclear and ICBM tests
Saeed Laylaz, an economics professor and a political activist affiliated with the moderate camp in Iran, speculated in an Eghtesaad 24 interview on 14 April that:
In my opinion, the action of the Israelis in attacking the Iranian consulate [in Damascus] and the subsequent threats, destroyed the final justification for Iran not to test its own atomic bomb and enter the nuclear club.
He linked a possible decision by Tehran to test a nuclear weapon to the possibility of an major attack on the Iranian homeland by Israel or the United States:
We are now [in the period] after Iran’s military response to Israel’s military attack on the Islamic Republic’s consulate [in Damascus]. My prediction is that after Iran's attack on Israel, if Israel responds and Israel and the United States of America show the slightest reaction in terms of a military attack on Iran's mainland, Iran will test its first nuclear bomb. Because the last obstacle for this not to happen will be removed with a possible US or Israeli attack on Iran. This is a clear warning to the Americans, and the Americans are definitely aware of this warning. With the smallest open aggression of America and Israel on Iranian soil, I believe that Iran will conduct its nuclear test and make its atomic bomb public, and Iran's hands are never closed in this regard.
Javad Karimi Ghoddusi, a principlist-affiliated (conservative or hardliner) member of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (the Iranian parliament) who sits on its influential National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, more definitively posted on the social media website X (formerly Twitter) on 22 April that “If the permission is issued, it is [just] one week before the first [nuclear weapon] test.”
The Iranian lawmaker followed this up with a post on 23 April that said “If the permission is issued, it will take [just] one week to conduct the first test increasing [Iran’s] missile range to 12,000 kilometers.” This appears to be a reference to testing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a delivery vehicle capable of reaching the continental United States from Iran, which is normally considered suitable for carrying a nuclear warhead rather than a conventional one.
The possibility of a revision of Iran’s “nuclear doctrine”
An arguably more consequential, if somewhat oblique, reference to Iranian nuclear proliferation came from the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC). Brigadier General Ahmad Haghtalab, commander of the Nuclear Protection and Security Corps (IRGC-NPSC), made a video statement on 18 April at the height of tensions that month between the regional adversaries in which he pledged conventional missile strikes on Israeli nuclear installations in case of attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities:
“The nuclear centers of [Israel] have been identified. The necessary intelligence of all of the targets is available [to us] and [our] hands are, so to speak, on the trigger of our powerful missiles for the destruction of the designated targets. We must therefore respond to this threat that, in the event of any attack by [Israel] on our nuclear centers and facilities, will definitely be met with our response.”
He then went one step further to discuss possible changes to Iran’s “nuclear doctrine”:
“I am compelled to announce here that if there is any threat or action by [Israel] against the country’s nuclear facilities in order to pressure the Islamic Republic and make instrumental use of it, a revision in the nuclear doctrine and policies of the Islamic Republic and departure from previously stated considerations is possible and conceivable.
General Haghtalab therefore not only established the nature of Tehran’s response against Israel for any attack on Iranian nuclear facilities - conventional missile strikes against Israeli nuclear installations - but also raised the possibility of a “revision” to the country’s nuclear doctrine, which strongly suggests weapons proliferation.
In this case the source of the message may be just as important as the substance. The Nuclear Protection and Security Corps, headed by General Haghtalab, is an IRGC command created following repeated Iranian failures to stop Israeli sabotage and intelligence operations against the nuclear program. This command, whose name was revealed in March 2022 following the discovery of a sabotage network targeting the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, consolidated under the IRGC the role of securing Iran’s nuclear facilities. BBC Persian reported around the same time that responsibility for the security of nuclear facilities had been previously divided between the AEOI protection unit (internal security), the AEOI cyber defense base (cybersecurity), the National Passive Defense Organization (external security), and the IRGC Aerospace Force (air defense). It remains unclear if this web of responsibilities has been fully or only partially consolidated under the IRGC-NPSC.
The explicit messaging on the possibility of a change in Iran’s nuclear doctrine is thus more meaningful coming from General Haghtalab and the IRGC-NPSC, because they are a key part of Iran’s nuclear security structure and, if the country built nuclear weapons tomorrow, could reasonably be expected to play a role managing this arsenal.
The status of a suspected nuclear weapons research entity is formalized
A less noticed but equally important signal came with the decision of the Iranian parliament on 22 April to approve a plan that would formally establish the Defense Research and Innovation Organization (abbreviated in Persian as the SPND). This organization is responsible for emerging military technology research & development and is attached to Iran’s Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics.
SPND was founded and led by Brigadier General Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, believed to have been the father of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, until his assassination in November 2020. The Iranian parliament acknowledged General Fakhrizadeh’s legacy by stating that its decision to formally establish the SPND was made “… with the aim of continuing and consolidating the path of scientist martyr Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.” IRNA relates Article (2) of the approved plan as follows:
“SPND has a legal and independent personality with the essence of a government institution and has financial, transactional, and administrative independence and is administered within the framework of Armed Forces regulations and the approved statute without the obligation to comply with the country's public accounting law.”
The formal establishment of SPND, which may grant it a greater degree of autonomy and independence in its activities than it previously possessed, may be yet another sign of Iran’s strengthening of the option to build a nuclear weapon if the need arises.
Iranian leader questions true goals of nuclear talks and sanctions
More than two weeks of Iranian public discourse or outright signaling on nuclear proliferation was capped off by a speech by Ayatollah Khamenei on 24 April, who did not directly address Iran’s nuclear weapon option, but spoke on issues with bearing on it. In this speech he elucidated what he believed to be the true goals of economic sanctions on Iran and connected this topic to the question of further possible nuclear negotiations with the United States:
“The goal of sanctions is to put Islamic Iran in a tight spot…so that [we] follow their colonial and arrogant [policy] lines, surrender to their overbearing demands and their power hungry expectations, to subordinate [our] policies to their policies.”
Ayatollah Khamenei went on to gently admonish those in Iran who, he hoped with good intentions, call for nuclear talks with the United States, saying that “[T]heir expectations has no end,” referring to the US government. Recalling a speech he made several years ago in which he addressed the nuclear issue, he stated that:
“The Americans should specify how much nuclear retreat [by Iran], if it takes place, will satisfy them? They are not ready to specify it of course. They will come [forward] step by step until they reach what happened in a country in North Africa [Libya], meaning rolling back all of the nuclear equipment.”
The Iranian leader’s official website posted an article on the same day, examining the trajectory of sanctions on Iran after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and concluded:
Analyzing the Western sanctions imposed on Iran and the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear industry clearly reveals that there isn't a direct correlation between the two. The most significant wave of sanctions against Iran prior to the JCPOA was linked to the riots following the 2009 presidential elections in Iran, alongside concerns about supporting terrorism, in addition to the nuclear issue. While the nuclear aspect is often cited in the titles of these sanctions, a review of their impact, such as CISADA, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, and others, suggests that the primary goals of these sanctions have been targeting Iran's economy and addressing support for terrorism.
At least three key themes emerge from the speech and article on 24 April. The first is that the economic sanctions on Iran do not have narrow policy goals but rather aim to completely subordinate Tehran to the desired policies of Washington. Moreover these sanctions, from his perspective (or at least that of his office), are not primarily focused on the Iranian nuclear program, but rather weakening the Iranian economy and addressing Iran’s “support for terrorism” (i.e. the Axis of Resistance network).
This directly ties into the second theme: No amount of nuclear concessions by Iran will satisfy the United States until the entire program is rolled back. These first two themes lead to a major question: If the main goal of US sanctions is not to address nuclear proliferation, and no amount of nuclear concessions will satisfy the United States, is there any point to talks with it on this issue or rolling back the program?
A third theme is more subtle but no less important: The case of the de-nuclearization of Libya. The country under the Muammar Gaddafi regime sought to normalize relations with the United States in 2003 by completely rolling back its WMD programs and specifically its decades old nuclear program. But when mass demonstrations erupted against the regime during the Arab Spring in 2011, this normalization did not prevent the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization from supporting regime change backed with an air campaign. This case raises the counter-factual history question of whether Gaddafi would have met the same gruesome fate or his regime fallen if he had not surrendered Libya’s WMD programs, or advanced the programs to or beyond the threshold of building WMD (namely nuclear weapons).
Conclusion
We can draw several conclusions from Iran’s intensified nuclear weapon discourse and signaling outside of its official nuclear program in April 2024. First, in the context of the heightened Iran-Israel and US-Iran tensions last month stemming from the Israeli attack on an Tehran’s consular building in Damascus and the Iranian retaliatory strike, this discourse and signaling was clearly intended to deter Israel and the United States from carrying out a major attack on the country’s soil and especially its nuclear facilities. Iran’s nuclear weapon option may have in fact deterred such an attack and this could be a big instance of Tehran successfully using it in this way.
Furthermore, in line with Iran’s “new equation” since April that an Israeli attack anywhere on its “interests, assets, figures, and citizens” would be met with a direct retaliatory response from Iranian soil, General Haghtalab made clear that his government’s immediate response to an attack on its nuclear facilities would be a conventional missile strike on its regional adversary’s own nuclear installations.
Second, several voices from Tehran either suggested the possibility of a change in their government’s nuclear doctrine in case of a major attack on its soil or nuclear facilities, or the likelihood of a nuclear weapon or ICBM test in these circumstances. The much vaunted “nuclear fatwa” does not appear to be a major obstacle here. Such religious decrees, by their nature, can be revised under the right circumstances as Aghamiri’s interview makes clear. The Iranian leadership, nonetheless, is unlikely to openly signal a nuclear weapon test in advance if it decides to conduct one.
Third, the Gaza war, the possibility of the further escalation of this conflict to other states of the region, the prospect of a more assertively anti-Islamic Republic US administration in 2025, and possibility of a UN sanctions snapback next year, make it unlikely that the United States and Iran will be able to make major progress in nuclear negotiations during the remainder of this year. I have long questioned the willingness of the Iranian leadership to fully commit to such talks under President Ebrahim Raisi for the simple reason that a well developed nuclear weapon option is one of the few potential guarantees it possesses against another “maximum pressure”-style campaign by the current US administration or a future one. Significantly rolling back the nuclear program would therefore leave Tehran very vulnerable to the dangers lurking ahead. This frame of mind is underscored by Ayatollah Khamenei’s comments on nuclear talks and the parliament’s decision to formally establish the SPND.
Finally, while discussion of Iran’s capability to build nuclear weapons has been the subject of occasional commentary by former officials and public figures, there has been a distinct uptick in recent years that in my view reached a crescendo this April.
This public discourse, by no means uncritical of Iranian nuclear breakout, may nonetheless eventually positively predispose elite and popular opinion toward this eventuality, especially if meaningful nuclear negotiations and economic sanctions relief are not on the horizon, and they believe Iran has little left to lose and much to gain in terms of military power and national prestige from building nuclear weapons.
Several scenarios could trigger Iran’s decision to build the bomb. One, as we have already seen, is a major strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Another scenario is the destruction of a significant part of Tehran’s deterrence and power projection capability through the Axis of Resistance (happening, for example, as an outgrowth of the Gaza war). A third scenario could arise as a result of the decision by a new leadership in the country (following the passing or incapacitation of the current one) with the aim of securing the survival of the Islamic Republic system against foreign adversaries and projecting an image of strength to domestic audiences.