Interview with Al-Arabiya English on Iran's calculus on a response to Israel's attack

I gave an interview to Al-Arabiya English published on Thursday 31 October 2024 on Iran’s internal calculus on how to response to Israel’s attack in the short to long term.

You can read my full responses to the Al-Arabiya’s interviewer’s questions, which were not included in their entirety in the final article, below:

Iran’s reaction and potential response: Iran has publicly downplayed the impact of the strikes, with the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council claiming there was no impact on the country’s military capabilities. At the same time, Tehran has said it will respond, with the IRGC chief Hossein Salami today vowing “bitter and unimaginable consequences” for Israel.

Interpretation of Khamenei’s remarks: In his initial comments, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei did not directly call for immediate retaliation but said that Israel should be made to “understand the power of the Iranian nation.” He said the attacks should neither be downplayed no exaggerated. What actions do you anticipate from Iran in response? What are its practical options?

How do you interpret Khamenei’s comments here? He also mentioned that Iranian officials need to figure out how to make Israel “understand the power of the Iranian nation.” This seemed unusually passive for someone in his position, given said officials answer to and take orders from him. What is your take on this?

Israel's attack on Iran is highly significant: It is the first overt and large scale attack on Iran by another state actor since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. It is also the most significant operation - overt or covert - conducted by Israel against the Islamic Republic. Moreover, while dozens of Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) personnel have been killed by Israel inside and outside of Iran, this was the first attack to lead to the death of Iranian Army personnel - four according to the Iranian government.

It represents the breaking of a major taboo and is a disturbing development that could be a harbinger of more such attacks in the future. Furthermore, it is a rebuke to both the Islamic Republic and IRGC, who have attempted to premise their legitimacy and the justification for their rule on providing security to the nation, while security has steadily deteriorated in recent years.

Tehran has several options to respond, each of which can be calibrated to be symbolic, in the medium range, or large-scale: It can respond through the Axis of Resistance; It can respond directly from Iran using missiles and drones as it did in operations True Promise 1 and 2; or It can respond through a combination of the two.

The Iranian leadership's messaging - including by Ayatollah Khamenei - has been to acknowledge the attack, while downplaying its damage, instead highlighting the supposed effectiveness of Iran's air defenses, or the prospect of a lasting ceasefire in Gaza or Lebanon. This response represents Tehran's hope to prevent further escalation of the attacks against it, the vulnerability of its petroleum industry and and other sites given the degradation of its air defenses, as well as its desire to keep open the possibility for nuclear and sanctions-relief negotiations with the next US administration.

Given this background, Iran may promise retaliation but forgo a response for the time being (as it did after the assassination of Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran), or carry out a response that is symbolic, deniable, or on the lower end of the spectrum above. Despite Iran's intentions, however, Israel may respond to any Iranian military action.

Future dynamics: Given that both Iran and Israel have now openly targeted each other, do you think this marks a shift to direct confrontation as a “new normal” in their relationship? Could we be seeing a shift from indirect to more overt engagements?

It is unclear if this is the new normal, although the dynamics are certainly shifting in this direction. Some of that will depend on the restraint placed on Israel by the next US administration. The Islamic Republic will certainly want to prevent such overt and large attacks on its territory from becoming the new normal. If events move in this direction, Tehran will try to find a way to deter Israel again from conducting such overt attacks, whether that's through rebuilding the Axis of Resistance in the Levant, strengthening its conventional military capabilities, seeking to "break out" or "sneak out" to nuclear weapons, a combination of all of the above, or possibly moving toward a diplomatic resolution of this conflict.